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Constitutional Law-RIGHT TO JuRY TRIAL-DELEGATION OF JUDI-
CIAL FUNCTIONS TO NON JUDICIAL MEDICAL REVIEW pANEL HELD V 10-
LATIVE OF STATE CoNSTITUTION-Wright u. Central DuPage Hospi-
tal Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). 
Jean Mary Wright brought an action in the circuit court of 
Cook County, Illinois, seeking damages from Central DuPage 
Hospital Association, Dr. John Heitzler, American Hospital Sup-
ply Corporation, and V. Mueller & Company for injuries sus-
tained in the defendant hospital while under the care of Dr. 
Heitzler. In addition, ·Ms. Wright sought a declaratory judgment 
that recent amendments to the Illinois Civil Practice Act1 were 
1. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-58.10 (1975). The 
following portions of the act are relevant to this note: 
§ 58.2 Procedures in medical malpractice cases 
In all cases in which the plaintiff seeks damages on account of injuries 
sustained by reason of medical, hospital or other healing art malpractice, the 
provisions of Sections 58.3 through 58.10 shall be applicable. Sections 58.3 
through 58.10 shall not apply to any other cases. 
§ 58.3 Formation of medical review panel 
In each case filed, the court shall order convened a medical review panel to 
which the case shall be assigned for hearing and determination. Such order shall 
be issued no sooner than 120 days nor later than one year after the parties are 
at issue on the pleadings. The medical review panel shall consist of one circuit 
judge, one practicing physician, and one practicing attorney selected as pro-
vided in Section 58.5. 
§58.6 Medical review panel procedures 
(1) The judge on the panel shall preside over all proceedings of the panel 
and shall determine all procedural issues, including matters of evidence. The 
panel shall convene with notice to all parties and shall proceed as a body to hear 
evidence and argument on the question of liability and on the question of dam-
ages. The provisions of this Act concerning procedure in civil cases shall be 
followed insofar as practicable. The law of evidence shall be followed, except as 
the panel in its discretion may determine otherwise. 
(2) Proceedings before the panel shall be adversary, and each party may 
call and cross examine witnesses and introduce evidence as at a trial in the 
circuit court. The panel shall have the power of subpoena, to be exercised as in 
the circuit court. The panel, however, may call witnesses, examine evidence, call 
for additional or particular evidence, and may examine or cross examine wit-
nesses as it may determine to be appropriate. 
(3) The panel shall consider the pleadings, the evidence, including discov-
ery materials, hospital and medical records, affidavits and such witnesses and 
exhibits as the panel or the parties may call or introduce into evidence. 
(4) Proceedings of the panel may be conducted in any county in the judi-
cial circuit, as determined by the panel with notice to all parties if not in the 
county in which venue lies. 
§58. 7 Decisions of medical review panels 
(1) The panel shall make its determination according to the applicable 
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substantive law. Its determination on the issue of liability and, if liability is 
found, on the issue of fair and just compensation for damages, shall be made in 
a written opinion. The panel shall state its conclusions of fact and its conclu-
sions of law. A dissenting member may file a written dissent. 
(2) The panel shall notify all parties when its determination is to be 
handed down, and, within 7days of its decision, shall serve a copy of its opinion 
and any dissent on each party and each attorney of record. The panel shall file 
its opinion with the Clerk. 
§ 58.8 Effect of decision of medical review panel 
(1) The parties may, by unanimous written agreement, elect to be bound 
by the determination of a medical review panel at any time. In such event, the 
determination of the panel shall be binding and conclusive, and judgment may 
be entered thereon. ' 
(2) In cases where the determination of the panel is unanimous, and where 
the parties have not unanimously agreed in writing to be bound by the determi-
nation of the panel, each party must file with the Clerk his written acceptance 
or rejection of the determination within 28 days of receipt of service of the 
written opinion. Any party not timely filing a rejection of the determination 
shall be deemed to have accepted it. If the determination is accepted by all 
parties, the Court may enter judgment thereon. 
(3) Whenever the parties have unanimously agreed to be bound by the 
determination of the panel, the Court shall enter judgment thereon unless the 
parties shall unanimously agree that no judgment be entered. 
(4) A determination of a medical panel shall not be admissible at any 
subsequent trial in the circuit court. Whenever the parties have not unani-
mously agreed to be bound by a determination of a medical review panel, or 
have not unanimously accepted the determination of a panel, the panel judge 
shall conduct a pretrial conference promptly upon r~sonable notice pursuant 
to Supreme Court Rules governing pretrial conferences, and the case shall pro-
ceed to trial as in any other civil case, except that any judge who served on a 
medical review panel in the case may not preside at the trial. 
(5) Whenever a unanimous determination of a medical review panel is 
rejected by a party, each party that has accepted the determination may request 
any medical society which has supplied names for the roster of practicing physi-
cians for that panel to provide an expert witness for consultation and, if neces-
sary, for testimony at the trial. Upon such request, the medical society shall 
make its best good faith efforts to provide a qua!lified physician to consult with 
and, if requested, to testify at the trial. 
§ 58.9 Expenses of litigation 
(1) Non-judicial members of medical review panels shall serve without 
compensation; except that they shall receive their actual expenses for travel and 
other costs incurred in the performance of their duties. 
(3) Where a party who has rejected a unanimous determination of the 
medical review panel does not prevail on the trial of the case and has not been 
granted a post-trial motion to upset the result of the trial, the trial court on 
motion of the prevailing party shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the 
reasonable attorneys fees of the prevailing parties and the costs of the medical 
review panel and the costs of trial shall be summarily taxed to the rejecting 
party in accordance with Section 41 of this Act. Such motion may not be made 
or granted if both a party plaintiff and a party defendant have rejected the 
determination of the medical review panel. 
( 5) If a party shall reject a unanimous determination of the medical review 
panel, his filing of such written rejection shall be deemed to constitute a refiling 
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in violation of the state constitution.2 
The amended portions of the act provide for the formation 
and operation of medical malpractice review panels, each com-
posed of one circuit court judge, one practicing physician, and one 
practicing attorney. All cases in which plaintiffs seek damages for 
injuries sustained from "medical, hospital, or other healing art 
malpractice" are submitted to the panel for attempted resolu-
tion. If the contesting parties do not unanimously agree with the 
decision of the panel, the act allows suit to be filed with the 
circuit court to proceed to trial in the customary manner. 
The circuit court found that these provisions violated article 
VI, sections 1 and 9 of the Illinois Constitution by delegating 
essentially judicial functions to nonjudicial personnel, and article 
I, section 13 by impairing the protected right to trial by jury. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in all respects 
relevant to this note.3 
I. BACKGROUND 
Various substitutes for the traditional system of dispute reso-
of his complaint, if plaintiff, or his answer, if defendant, for the purposes of any 
motion as hereinafter provided, pursuant to Section 41 of this Act. 
§ 58.10 Supervisory rules of Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court may adopt rules not inconsistent with Sections 58.2 
through 58.9 of this Act to govern procedures to be used in selecting medical 
review panels and rosters and in the hearing and determination of cases by such 
panels. The Supreme Court may adopt rules increasing the size of medical 
review panel rosters in the respective judicial circuits. 
2. This note deals only with the issues of the delegability of judicial functions to 
nonjudicial personnel and the right to trial by jury. The instant case also consolidated 
separate actions filed in the circuit court of Cook County by Hartford Casualty Insurance 
Company and The Medical Protective Company, both of which sought declaratory judg-
ments holding invalid Medical Malpractice Act§ 3, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 1013a (1975), 
dealing with the restriction of malpractice policy rate increases or cancellations by the 
Director of Insurance. Ms. Wright also contested the constitutionality of ILL. REv. STAT. 
ch. 83, § 22.1, altering the statute of limitations in favor of the physician, and ILL. REv. 
STAT. ch. 70, § 101, limiting the maximum amount recoverable as a result of medical 
malpractice to $500,000. 
For background on the attempts of other legislatures to enact similar legislation and 
the judicial response thereto, see secondary authorities cited in notes 69, 73 infra. 
3. The Supreme Court of Illinois vacated only the circuit court's finding of unconsti-
tutionality relating to Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.2a (1975) 
(a provision dealing with releases from liability as a condition of medical treatment), a 
section unimportant for the purposes of this note. 
Both the circuit and supreme courts also found in favor of Ms. Wright's other two 
contentions and in favor of the two insurance companies by declaring that Medical Mal-
practice Act § 3, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1; ch. 70, § 101; and ch. 73, § 1013a (1975), 
constituted special legislation contrary to Illinois Constitution art. IV, § 13. 63111. 2d 313, 
325-32, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741-44 (1976). 
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lution by trial have been attempted. As discussed below, such 
attempts have met with mixed results in different jurisdictions, 
and have been challenged as unconstitutional on grounds of im-
proper delegation of judicial power and denial of the right to jury 
trial. Judicial and legislative treatment of one alternative, arbi-
tration, is particularly relevant to the instant case, since it is a 
commonly approved example of nonjudicial, nonjury trial resolu-
tion of disputes. Although the Illinois statute under consideration 
in this note is not an arbitration statute, enough similarities exist 
to merit a brief examination of arbitration in a constitutional 
framework. 
A. Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes 
Courts initially viewed agreements to arbitrate with distrust, 
fearing in such accords a dangerous encroachment into the judi-
cial realm, and uniformly held arbitration agreements void and 
unenforceable.4 The judiciary's growing unwillingness to interfere 
with private individuals' contractual rights, however, combined 
with an increasing number of state statutes protecting the right 
to form arbitration agreements, gradually changed the disposi-
tion of the courts.5 Recently, statutes guaranteeing the enforcea-
bility of arbitration agreements have consistently been upheld 
when constitutionally challenged as impermissible delegations of 
judicial functions. 8 
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF 
THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE app. 316 (1973) (hereinafter cited as 
COMM'N REPORT]. 
5. Perry v. Cobb, 88 Me. 435, 34 A. 278 (1896) involved two shippers who signed a 
written agreement that established them as co-partners in insuring each other for lost 
cargo and provided that the two lhould determine the amount of such loss without a resort 
to the courts. The Supreme Court of Maine held that the agreement was not strictly an 
arbitration contract, since it did not provide for a disinterested third party to arbitrate, 
and thus skirted the nondelegability of judicial functions issue. Id. at 436, 34 A. at 279. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to find unconstitutional a state statute 
that permitted voluntary arbitration agreements and held that parties who entered such 
contracts waived their rights to jury trial and appeal. Cutter v. Richley, 151 Pa. 195, 25 
A. 96 (1892). 
Some years later, a California court of appeals summarized what had become the 
accepted opinion regarding contractual arbitration agreements: 
[An arbitration contract] does not authorize individuals by agreement to oust 
superior courts of their jurisdiction to try civil actions. . . . It merely recognizes 
the right of individuals to enter into binding contracts requiring the submission 
to arbitration of differences existing between them with respect to the terms of 
the agreement. 
Snyder v. Superior Court of Amador County, 24 Cal. App. 2d 263, 265, 74 P.2d 782, 784 
(1937). 
6. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (federal 
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Attempts to invalidate arbitration agreements as a violation 
of the right to trial by jury have also been unsuccessful. Ground-
ing its finding on the fact that a jury trial is a right that can be 
waived, the New York Court of Appeals in Berkovitz v. Arbib & 
Houlberg1 found that parties to an arbitration agreement volun-
tarily consent to waive the jury right. Facing a similar issue in a 
constitutional challenge to that state's procedure for mediating 
malpractice claims,8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld 
agreements enforcing the panel's decisions when the parties vol-
untarily agree to be bound, despite significant procedural disad-
vantages should a party refuse to agree.9 
Compulsory arbitration statutes that require the parties to 
submit to arbitration and its results are at the opposite end of the 
spectrum: courts view such statutes as suspect and generally find 
some basis to hold them unconstitutional. 10 A recent Supreme 
Court of Illinois decision invalidated the compulsory arbitration 
provision of the state's no-fault automobile insurance statute par-
tially on the ground that it violated the right to jury trial. 11 
diversity action by corporation to avoid arbitration agreement with buyer of its products 
proved unsuccessful because parties intended to contract to arbitrate such a dispute); 
Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965) (father could not 
void contract entered into with medical group on behalf of his child providing for arbitra-
tion of any controversy); Tuschman Steel Co. v. Tuschman, 181 N.E.2d 322 (C.P. Ohio, 
1961) (action to enforce arbitration agreement not violative of constitutional provision 
guaranteeing that courts shall be open to every person for redress of injury). 
7. 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921). 
8. The New Jersey Plan, established by rule of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
requires that before the panel will provide expert witnesses for the claimant at any subse-
quent trial caused by the defendant's rejection of the panel's findings, the claimant must 
sign a binding agreement, similar to an arbitration contract, not to litigate if the finding 
in his or her behalf is unfavorable. N.J. CT. C.P.R. 4:21-7. Because expert witnesses are 
essential to establish a cause of action in a malpractice suit and are difficult to obtain 
due to the professional cohesiveness of physicians, a powerful incentive to sign the agree-
ment exists: even if the claimant prevails before the panel, it will be extremely difficult 
to obtain a judgment in court without the provided witnesses. Thus, the claimant under-
goes significant pressure to surrender his right to a subsequent jury trial should the panel's 
determination be in favor of the defendant. 
9. Grove v. Seltzer, 56 N.J. 321, 266 A.2d 301 (1970). 
10. See, e.g., Henderson v. Ugalde, 61 Ariz. 221, 147 P .2d 490 (1944) (statute forcing 
parties to arbitrate without consent unconstitutional). 
11. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The case turns on the 
Judicial Act of 1962, retained by the court's interpretation in article VI of the 1970 Illinois 
Constitution, which abolished trials de novo. I d. at 489-90, 283 N .E.2d at 480-81. Since 
the no-fault statute permitted a party dissatisfied with the result of the arbitration panel 
to appeal by a trial de novo, the court held that it violated the intent of article VI of he 
constitution. Although this reassning is at best incomplete, the violation of the right to 
jury trial apparently results from a constitutional breach of article VI, making the case 
questionable precedent for the proposition that a compulsory arbitration statute would 
be a derogation of the right to trial by jury in Illinois. 
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Exceptions to this general rule exist, however. The most ob-
vious example of a permissible restriction on the right to jury trial 
appears in compulsory workmen's compensation acts. Such stat-
utes are usually upheld under the rationale that state constitu-
tional guarantees to the right of trial by jury apply to causes of 
action as they existed at common law, and that workmen's com-
pensation statutes abolished old causes of action and created new 
ones. 12 Pennsylvania has enacted provisions requiring arbitration 
of all civil controversies of $1,000 or less, regardless of the parties' 
willingness or consent to do so. 13 Constitutional challenges to the 
arbitration statute, including the charge of denial of the right to 
a jury trial, were rejected by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania.14 The court held that since the statute did not close the 
courts completely to a litigant by making the decision of the 
arbitration board a final determination, but rather permitted an 
appeal by trial de novo, the jury trial right was preserved. 15 
Adoption of the Uniform Arbitration Act by Illinois in 1961 
broadened permissible arbitration rights and enabled parties to 
arbitrate any existing or future claims by written agreement. 16 
Recognizing in the act a legislative intent to discourage litigation 
and foster voluntary resolution of disputes by arbitration, Illinois 
courts have consistently upheld arbitration agreements when val-
idly executed. 17 Summarized by an appellate court of Illinois, it 
12. See Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 242 P. 314 (1925); Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 
217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940); Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 156 
Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929). Further justification appears in a mutual surrender of rights 
and defenses: the employee gives up the right to recover beyond the statutory limit and 
the employer is prevented from invoking the defense of no negligence. 
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 21 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977). 
14. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 2~3, 122 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. 
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). 
15. ld. at 230-31, 112 A.2d at 629-30. 
16. Uniform Arbitration Act § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 101-123 (1975). Subse-
quent to the decision invalidating malpractice mediation panels in the instant case, an 
amendment was passed excluding from the scope of the Uniform Aribitration Act "any 
agreement between a patient and a hospital or health care provider to submit to binding 
arbitration .... " P.A. 79-1361 § 9, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1977). A new act was substituted that specifically allows parties to a malpractice contro-
versy to sign and enforce an arbitration agreement. Malpractice Arbitration Act § 1, ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). Forced by the Supreme Court of 
Dlinois to abandon the mandatory submission of malpractice claims to a mediation panel, 
the legislature thus displayed its continued intention to design an alternative to the 
traditional court process for settling malpractice cases. 
17. E.g., Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 242 N .E.2d 149 (otherwise valid 
arbitration agreement between automobile insurer and insured did not extend to specific 
issues under dispute); Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Dl. App. 2d 262, 243 N.E.2d 711 (arbitra-
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is "a well recognized principle that courts should look with favor 
upon arbitration as a method of settling controversies. " 18 
B. Delegation of Judicial Functions to Nonjudicial Personnel 
1. Precedent in Illinois 
The Illinois Constitution provides for a separation of powers 
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state 
government and stipulates that "[n]o branch shall exercise pow-
ers properly belonging to another." 19 State judicial power is 
vested in a supreme court, appellate court, and circuit courts,20 
the latter assuming original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters 
with limited exceptions accorded to the supreme court.21 
Judicial response to legislative attempts to encroach on the 
jurisdiction of the courts has been strict. The Supreme Court of 
Illinois has defined judicial power as "an exclusive and exhaus-
tive grant vesting all such power in the courts,"22 reflecting a 
much earlier decision that "the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, 
so far as conferred by the constitution, cannot be taken away, nor 
can it be changed or abridged by an act of the legislature."23 
Proper jurisdiction of the courts encompasses all "inherently ju-
dicial functions," defined in People v. Bruner to include "[t]he 
interpretation of statutes, the determination of their validity, and 
the application of the rules and principles of the common law, 
among others .... " 24 Distinguishing a Pennsylvania case, the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Grace v. Howlett stated that a compul-
sory arbitration statute for automobile insurance claims inter-
fered with the original jurisdiction of the circuit court. 25 
tion agreement that covered future as well as existing controversies when contract entered 
into did not oust courts of jurisdiction). 
18. William B. Lucke, Inc. v. Spiegel, 131 Ill. App. 2d 532, 535, 266 N.E.2d 504, 507 
(1970). 
19. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 1. 
20. Id. art. VI, § 1. 
21. Id. art. VI, § 9. The entire section reads: 
Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except 
when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to 
redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve 
or resume office. Circuit Couuts shall have such power to review administrative 
action as prescribed by law. 
22. Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952). 
23. Birkowitz v. Lester, 121 Ill. 99, 106, 11 N.E. 860, 863 (1887). 
24. People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 158, 175 N.E. 400, 405 (1931). 
25. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 490, 283 N.E.2d 474,480 (1972). The basis of the 
court's opinion, however, was that because the statute provided for an appeal by a party 
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2. Precedent in other jurisdictions 
Malpractice mediation panels exist in various forms in 
eleven states. 28 New Hampshire, 27 Florida, 28 and New York29 have 
created malpractice review panels similar to that of Illinois. Con-
stitutional provisions affecting the delegation of judicial func-
tions under which such statutes were enacted, however, differ 
among the states. 
New Hampshire's Constitution contains a separation of pow-
ers article that provides that "the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial [powers] ought to be kept as separate from, and indepen-
dissatisfied with the board's determination, proceedings before the arbitration board 
could not be likened to pretrial procedure and were violative of the Judicial Act of 1962, 
which abolished trials de novo. Note 11 supra. See also Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 
139 N.E. 95 (1923); White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 129 N.E. 753 (1921). 
These cases found that executory agreements to arbitrate any dispute that may arise 
under the agreement and that preclude the individual's resort to the courts are void and 
unenforceable. The court in Grace, Cocalis, and Slawek, however, did not deal with the 
constitutionality of a mediation panel whose decisions are not binding and do not limit 
access to the courts, failing the assent of the parties in each case. 
26. Miike, State Legisltures Address the Medical Malpractice Situation, 8 J. LEGAL 
Mm. 25, 26 (1975). 
27. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 519-A:1 to -A:10 (1974). Malpractice claims must first 
be submitted to a mediation panel composed of a layman, a physician, and a judicial 
referee, who is usually a judge of one of the courts of original jurisdiction. The procedure 
before the panel is informal and controlled by the referee. The panel is requied to apply 
the appropriate state laws in reaching its decision and to make a finding of damages if 
the determination is in favor of the claimant. Both parties must file an acceptance or 
rejection of the panel's decision within 30 days: if both agree to the finding, it is legally 
enforceable; if one or both reject the decision, the claimant my instigate litigation in the 
appropriate court. Findings of the panel are not admissible in any subsequent court 
proceedings. 
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44, .47 (West Supp. 1977). A circuit court judge (referee), 
a licensed physician, and an attorney compose the malpractice mediation panel to which 
claims must initially be submitted. Mter the complaint is filed, the defendant has 20 days 
to respond. If no answer is filed, the jurisdiction of the panel ceases, making direct entry 
into the courts possible. If the defendant does respond, the panel is required to determine 
if actionable negligence occurred. If the parties agree, the panel may then continue media-
tion to assist the parties in reaching a settlement. If either party rejects the panel's 
determination, the claimant may instigate litigation in the usual manner. The conclusion 
of the panel, but not its specific findings of fact, is admissible in subsequent proceedings. 
The judicial referee has "exclusive authority to rule on all matters of law and the admissi-
bility of relevant evidence as may be adduced by the parties." In re Transition Rule 21, 
316 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 1975). 
29. N.Y. Jun. LAw § 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). The medical malpractice 
panel is composed of a supreme court justice, a physician, and a lawyer, with the justice 
presiding over the panel's sessions. Malpractice claims are submitted first to the panel 
for an informal hearing on the issues. If the panel reaches a disposition, an appropriate 
order to that effect is entered. If no decision is tendered, the case is remanded to its regular 
place on the court's calendar. In the event either party does not concur with the panel's 
determination, the claimant can bring an action in the usual manner. A unanimous 
written recommendation of the panel is admissible in any subsequent court proceedings. 
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dent of, each other, as the nature of a free government will admit 
• • • • "
30 Although not as strict in its definition of the division of 
powers as the similar Illinois provision, 31 the article has been 
interpreted by New Hampshire courts to have essentially the 
same effect as its Illinois counterpart, with only some additional 
leeway for an overlapping of powers.32 The New Hampshire Con-
stitution is substantially more liberal than that of Illinois in the 
role assigned the legislature to outline the jurisdiction of the 
courts. New Hampshire has no autonomous unified court of origi-
nal jurisdiction, and several of the courts in which litigation origi-
nates are dependent ·upon the legislature for the regulation of 
their jurisdiction.33 
The Constitution of Florida enunciates a separation of pow-
ers doctrine virtually identical to that of Illinois. 34 Original juris-
diction for all cases not cognizable by the county courts vests in 
the circuit courts.35 
New York's Constitution contains no specific separation of 
powers section. With the exception of certain courts established 
to handle matters specifically outlined in the constitution, 38 
"general original jurisdiction in law and equity" lies with the 
supreme court. 37 A general section in the article on the judiciary, 
however, gives the legislature "the same power to alter and regu-
late the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it 
has heretofore exercised, "38 thus affording the legislature in cer-
tain circumstances greater authority to modify the original juris-
diction of the various courts than exists in any of the three states 
previously discussed. 
30. N.H. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 37. 
31. Note 19 and accompanying text supra. 
32. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 A. 640 (1933). 
33. N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 76-77, 80. 
34. FLA. CoNST. art. 2, § 3 provides: "The powers of the state government shall be 
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one 
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless 
expressly provided herein." 
35. ld. art. 5, § 5. Article 5, § 6 establishes a county court in each county and gives 
the legislature power to prescribe by general law the jurisdiction of these courts. Presently 
the county courts have original jurisdiction over all actions at law where the amount in 
controversy does not exceed $2,500. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.01 (West 1974). The majority of 
malpractice claims exceed this sum, however, and original jurisdiction of such suits would 
thus lie with the circuit court under FLA. CoNST. art. 5, § 5. 
36. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI,§ 9 (Court of Claims);§§ 10-11 (County Court);§ 12 (Surro-
gate's Court); § 13 (Family Court); § 15 (Civil and Criminal Courts in New York City); § 
16 (District Courts); § 17 (Town, Village, and City Courts). 
37. ld. § 7(a). 
38. ld. § 30. 
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Medical malpractice review panels have not been declared 
unconstitutional in any other jurisdiction, including the three 
discussed above, on the ground that judicial functions have been 
delegated impermisibly to nonjudicial personnel. 
C. Interferences with the Right to Trial by Jury 
The seventh amendment guarantee of the right to trial by 
jury in suits at common law has not been applied to the states 
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.39 
Consequently, states are not required to apply federal law re-
specting the jury right to malpractice claims. 40 Every state but 
one, however, has a constitutional provision ensuring the right to 
trial by jury in civil actionsY With the exception of workmen's 
compensation statutes, a statute enacting a system of compulsory 
arbitration for general civil cases would probably be declared 
unconstitutional in nearly every state.42 The constitutionality of 
state laws that provide for methods of mediation amounting to 
less than compulsory arbitration remains in doubt. 
1. Precedent in Illinois 
The Illinois Constitution provides that "[t]he right of trial 
by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate."43 This has 
been interpreted to incorporate the right to jury trial as it existed 
at common law when the first Illinois constitution was adopted. 44 
39. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1923); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 542 (9th ed. 1975); see Montana Co. v. St. Louis 
Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894); Walker v. Saurinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876). 
40. Like many other state laws that have established malpractice review panels, the 
Illinois statute does not answer .the question of whether a claim brought under diversity 
jurisdiction would also first have to be presented to the mediation panel before advancing 
to federal district court. It is clear, however, that once a malpractice action is brought 
under lllinois law in federal district court, the seventh amendment jury right guarantee 
will apply. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this note to discuss the potentially 
different impact the federal guarantee to a jury trial might have on mediation panel 
proceedings. 
41. See 8 STAN. L. REv. 410, 413 n.25 (1956). 
42. 8 STAN. L. REv. 410 (1956). Pennsylvania is possibly the only exception. Notes 
13-15 and accompanying text supra. 
43. ILL. CoNST. art. 1, § 13. 
44. People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. at 146, 175 N.E. at 401; George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 
47 N.E. 741 (1897). In George, the court, referring to the state constitutions of 1818, 1848, 
and 1870, stated: 
We do not think there is any substantial difference between the provisions 
incorporated in the three constitutions. The right of trial by jury was the same 
under one constitution as under the other. The right protected by each constitu-
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The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Kelly45 reiterated the 
components of the common law jury right as requiring twelve 
impartial, qualified jurors who should unanimously decide the 
facts in controversy under the direction and superintendence of 
a judge; but the court also stated that "[i]t is well settled that 
the object of a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of 
a trial by jury is to preserve the substance of the right rather than 
to prescribe the details of the methods by which it shall be exer-
cised and enjoyed. "46 As was held in a later Illinois case, "the 
right of trial by jury is not so inelastic as to render unchangeable 
every characteristic and specification of the common law jury 
system. Flexibility for the adjustment of details remains, as long 
as the essentials of the system are retained. " 47 
As noted previously, the court found in Grace v. Howlett that 
a compulsory arbitration statute interfered with the right to trial 
by jury.48 In the instant case, however, the Illinois court con-
fronted for the first time a statutory scheme providing for the 
mandatory mediation of claims with provision for a resort to the 
customary channels to instigate litigation, rather than an appeal, 
should the parties fail to agree. 
2. Precedent in other jurisdictions 
Constitutional provisions in New Hampshire,49 Florida, 5° and 
tion was the right of trial by jury as it existed at common law. 
ld. at 455, 47 N.E. at 743. 
The setting of damages was not a function reserved for the jury under the common 
law. The Illinois Supreme Court has held: 
At common law an assessment of damages is an inquest of office, usually per-
formed by the sheriff upon a writ of inquiry of damages, or might be assessed 
by the court. It has been distinctly held that assessment of damages is not a 
trial, and does not come within the provisions of the constitution. 
O'Brian v. Brown, 403 Ill. 183, 193, 85 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1949). Customary practice in 
Illinois, however, is to the contrary. See Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 
486, 488 (N.D. Ill. 1957). 
45. 347 Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931). 
46. I d. at 224, 179 N .E. at 899. 
47. People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d 287, 299, 161 N.E.2d 325, 332 (1959). 
48. 51 Ill. 2d at 489-90, 283 N.E.2d at 480-81. For an explanation of the limitation of 
this opinion as precedent respecting the right to trial by jury, see note 11 supra. 
49. N.H. CoNST. pt. 1, art. 20. 
In all controversies concerning property-and in all suits between two or 
more persons, except in cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and 
practiced, and except in cases in which the value in controversy does not exceed 
five hundred dollars, and title of real estate is not concerned the parties have a 
right to a trial by jury and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless, 
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New York51 ensuring the right to trial by jury are in all essential 
respects similar to that of Illinois. The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire has stated that "[ t]he constitutional right of jury 
trial is not infringed if a reasonably unfettered right of appeal 
from a justice to a jury court is allowed."52 Thus, the legislature 
may design alternative methods of adjudication, provided that a 
jury trial is ultimately available to the parties. Such precedent 
may in part be responsible for the lack of any constitutional chal-
lenge to New Hampshire's malpractice mediation panel. 
The Supreme Court of Florida established early precedent 
that the guarantee of a jury trial would be strictly construed: "It 
shall 'remain inviolate.' This term does not merely imply that the 
right of jury trial shall not be abolished or wholly denied but that 
it shall not be impaired. "53 Such precedent, however, has not 
prevented the court from participating in the establishment of 
the Florida malpractice mediation panel, which requires a claim-
ant to first file with the panel and attempt arbitration with the 
defendant before being permitted to resort to a jury trial. In re 
Transition Rule 2154 sets out procedural rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Florida for the operation of the panel. A recent 
appeal challenging the constitutionality of the malpractice stat-
ute on equal protection grounds and as an abridgement of free 
access to the courts was unsuccessful. 55 The court's opinion made 
no mention of the denial of the right to trial by jury. The concur-
ring opinion compared the mediation panel procedure to a re-
quired pretrial settlement conference, a procedure common in 
many jurisdictions before litigation progresses to trial. 58 
The New York malpractice mediation panel was originally 
established by judicial action on an experimental basis, 57 and was 
in cases arising on the high seas and such as relates to mariners' wages the 
legislature shall think it necessary to alter it. 
50. FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22. "The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and 
remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall 
be fixed by law." 
51. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2. "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been 
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may 
be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law." 
52. Perkins v. Towle, 58 N.Y. 425 (1878). 
53. Flint River Steam Boat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848) (emphasis in original). 
54. 316 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1975). 
55. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976). 
56. /d. at 807. 
57. The Appellate Division, First Department, of the Supreme Court of New York 
established an experimental panel procedure for the handling of medical malpractice 
claims on August 31, 1971. N.Y. CT. R. § 636.1 (McKinney 1976). 
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later enacted into law by the legislature. 58 Recently the statute 
was challenged on constitutional grounds in Halpern v. Gozan59 
by a physician who alleged that the introduction at trial of the 
panel's finding of his negligence so prejudiced the jurors as to 
deprive him of his right to trial by jury. In rejecting this conten-
tion and upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court 
concluded that "the new [mediation panel] law, if carefully pur-
sued and thoughtfully articulated does not represent an incursion 
upon constitutional guarantees, but rather, reflects the proper 
extension of legislative prerogatives."80 
n. INsTANT CAsE 
The court relied on article VI, sections 1 and 9 of the Illinois 
Constitution, which vests general judicial authority in a state 
court system and original jurisdiction for all justiciable matters 
in the circuit courts, to find that use of the malpractice panel was 
unconstitutional in that it granted essentially judicial functions 
to nonjudicial personnel. 81 The major issue in the delegability of 
judicial functions was who is authorized to apply the substantive 
law to findings of fact. The appropriate statutory section provides 
that "[ t]he panel shall make its determination according to the 
applicable substantive law."82 Such language, the court con-
58. N.Y. Jun. LAw§ 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). 
59. 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
60. !d. at 749. 
61. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40 
(1976). 
The court noted with apparent approval that the Illinois Civil Practice Act requires 
the judge member of the panel to "preside over all proceedings of the panel" and to 
"decide all procedural i~sues, including matters of evidence" in the framework of an 
adversary proceeding in which witnesses are examined and evidence is introduced "as at 
a trial in the circuit court." Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.6(1)-
(2) (1975). 
The court's opinion, perhaps unwittingly, echoes an ambiguity contained in this 
subsection of the statute. While the circuit judge is authorized to determine all procedural 
matters including questions of evidence, the concluding sentence of the subsection pro-
vides that "[t]he law of evidence shall be followed except as the panel in its discretion 
may determine otherwise." !d. § 58.6(1). The court does not overtly recognize in its 
opinion the existence of a conflict in meaning, but simply assumes that the latter provision 
take precedence over the judge's prerogative to decide procedural and evidentiary matters, 
and interprets this limitation on the judge's power as another opportunity for the nonjudi-
cial members of the panel to usurp a judicial function. 63 Ill. 2d at 322, 347 N.E.2d at 
739. Another interpretation not considered by the court that would permit an internally 
consistent reading of the statute would be that the physician and lawyer members of the 
panel serve as advisors to the judge on such procedural matters, but that any decision to 
vary from the law of evidence must have the concurrence of the judge. 
62. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.7(1) (1975). 
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eluded, implied that the physician and lawyer members of the 
panel had equal authority with the circuit judge to decide matters 
of law; thus, the possibility existed that nonjudicial members of 
the panel could overrule the judge in the application of principles 
of law, an inherently judicial function, thereby violating the sepa-
ration of powers provision of the state constitution. 83 
The court based its holding that the malpractice review 
panel violated the right to trial by jury in article I, section 13 of 
the Illinois Constitution. Quoting People v. Lobb, 84 the court in-
terpreted the right to a jury trial to be that right as it existed 
under common law, which "is the right to have the facts in con-
troversy determined, under the direction and superintendence of 
a judge, by the unanimous verdict of twelve impartial jurors 
.... "
85 Unsuccessful attempts at the last Illinois Constitutional 
Convention to modify the jury trial right influenced the court to 
strictly construe the Lobb standards. 88 
Unlike the court's analysis in regard to the nondelegability 
of judicial functions, its reasoning respecting the right to jury trial 
was not so categorically final. The court concluded that as long 
as the essentials of the common law right remain, flexibility exists 
in administering the right in practice, and details of the system 
can be adjusted. 87 At no time did the court specifically state that 
the procedure outlined for the malpractice review panel was itself 
a violation of the right to jury trial under article I, section 13. 
Rather, the court found for unstated reasons that the holding of 
unconstitutionality for improper delegation of judicial functions 
implied that the statute was also "an impermissible restriction on 
the right of trial by jury guaranteed by" the Illinois Constitu-
tion.88 
ill. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not dispose of the instant 
case in a vacuum of concern about the issues involved: recent 
marked increases in medical malpractice suits and awards in 
63. In support of its finding, the court cited People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 
400 (1931) and·Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952). Notes 22, 
24 and accompanying text supra. 
64. 17 Ill. 2d 287, 161 N .E.2d 325 (1959). 
65. ld. at 298, 161 N.E.2d at 331. 
66. 63 Ill. 2d at 323, 347 N.E.2d at 740. 
67. ld. at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 740-41 (relying on People v. Lobb, 17 Ill. 2d at 299, 161 
N.E.2d at 332). For text of material from Lobb quoted in the instant case, see text 
accompanying note 47 supra. 
68. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741. 
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Illinois and other states have created a well-publicized crisis in 
medical care that promises serious detriments to the patient. 69 
Insurance rates for malpractice coverage have increased dramati-
cally/0 resulting in the threat that many physicians will limit or 
curtail their practices.71 Such increases are caused at least in part 
by a geometric progression in the magnitude of personal injury 
awards.72 The response of state legislatures has been impressive; 
virtually every state has studied the malpractice problem, and 
most have enacted various legislative proposals to assist in the 
provision of reasonably priced malpractice insurance and to 
speed up the traditional litigation process for malpractice 
claims. 73 Eleven states have passed statutes establishing mal-
69. E.g., NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58; U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Jan. 20, 1975, 
at 53. For a comprehensive background of the complex issues surrounding the cause and 
drastic rise of malpractice suits, the problem of malpractice insurance, and suggested 
solutions, see CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 4. Other helpful publications of a general nature 
on medical malpractice include: R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABoUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1975); 
D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); A. HoLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw (1975). 
70. "Premiums for dentists rose 115 percent between 1960 and 1970; those for hospi-
tals, 262.7 percent; those for physicians other than surgeons, 540.8 percent; and those for 
surgeons, 949.2 percent." CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 4, at 13. It is not unusual for a 
physician to pay from $5,000 to $12,000 per year for malpractice insurance coverage. 
Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. Pt-. L. REv. 590, 595 n.16 (1973). 
71. Note, Ohio's Rx for the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays, 45 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 90, 90 n.1 (1976). 
72. One survey has reported the average recovery per claim in California over a 
several year period: $5,000 in 1969; $7,500 in 1973; $12,000 in 1975; and $25,000 projected 
in 1980. Mill, Malpractice Litigation: Are Solutions in Sight?, 232 J.A.M.A. 369 (1975). 
73. Miike, supra note 26, at 25. In language cited in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 
802 (Fla. 1976), the Florida legislature indicated its purposes in establishing a medical 
mediation panel procedure: 
WHEREAS, the cost of purchasing medical professional liability insurance 
for doctors and other health care providers has skyrocketed in the past few 
months; and 
WHEREAS, it is not uncommon to find physicians in high-risk categories 
paying premiums in excess of $20,000 annually; and 
WHEREAS, the consumer ultimately must bear the financial burdens cre-
ated by the high cost of insurance; and 
WHEREAS, without some legislative relief, doctors will be forced to curtail 
their practices, retire, or practice defensive medicine at increased cost to the 
citizens of Florida, and 
WHEREAS, the problem has reached crisis proportion in Florida, 
NOW THEREFORE * * * 
/d. at 805. Similar reasons were cited by the Supreme Court of New York in Halpern v. 
Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (Sup. Ct. 1976) for the enacting of New York's law. Briefs 
filed by amici curiae in the instant case and cited by the court pointed to similar problems 
in Illinois. 63 Ill. 2d at 321, 347 N .E.2d at 739. 
For other recent surveys of state legislative responses to the malpractice crisis, see 
Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TuL. L. REv. 655 
(1976); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice 
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practice mediation panels that provide in varying degrees for the 
prescreening or arbitration of claims. 74 Issues that are so wide-
spread and directly affect every person who requires medical serv-
ices demand the careful attention of the courts. 
In addition to the compelling nature of the underlying issues, 
court review of the constitutionality of a legislative act requires 
judicial caution. The Supreme Court of Florida, in holding that 
state's malpractice mediation panel constitutional, provided: 
It is incumbent on this Court when reasonably possible and 
consistent with constitutional rights to resolve all doubts as to 
the validity of a statute in favor of its constitutional validity and 
if possible a statute should be construed in such a manner as 
would be consistent with the constitution, that is in such a way 
as to remove it farthest from constitutional infirmity.75 
The New York Supreme Court, upholding the state statute creat-
ing mediation panels, concluded that an act of the legislature 
should be declared unconstitutional only if such a finding is ines-
capable.76 
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not refer in the instant 
case to this customarily strict standard in declaring unconstitu-
tional the malpractice mediation panel procedure. Perhaps the 
court felt its conclusions were so clear-cut that reference to the 
standard of construction was unnecessary. Also possible was the 
realization that exercising customary judicial caution before de-
claring the malpractice statute unconstitutional would require 
the court to undertake a more rigorous examination of the issues 
than it was willing to make. Although the court in its forthright 
but cursory treatment of the issues discussed in this note77 at-
tempted to convey the impression that the outcome of the case 
should be obvious, closer examination reveals that the court 
could have interpreted the statute to be reasonably consistent 
with the Illinois Constitution. 
Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417 (entire issue devoted to malpractice problems). For sympos-
ium discussions of recent legislative changes that have occurred in Indiana, Texas, and 
Montana, see Symposium, The 1975 Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 91 
(1975); Studen~ Symposium, A Study of Medical Malpractice in Texas, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 
732 (1976); Gibbs, The Montana Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Claims, 36 
MoNT. L. REv. 321 (1975). 
74. Miike, supra note 26, at 26, 30 (Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin). 
75. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d at 805. 
76. Halpern v. Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 749 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
77. The court was more comprehensive in its discussion of Medical Malpractice Act 
§ 4, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (1975), relating to the maximum amount recoverable 
from a malpractice claim, perhaps because a strong dissent was voiced on this issue. 
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A. Delegability of Judicial Functions 
The Illinois Constitution is exact in its grant of judicial au-
thority to the state court system and original jurisdiction to the 
circuit courts.78 Illinois case law generally has been strict in deal-
ing with division of powers questions.79 
Faced with a novel factual and legal situation, the court 
responded by mechanically applying constitutional principles to 
a situation for which they were not comfortably applicable. Al-
though the holding could be viewed as a reasonable application 
of analogous precedent to a new and pressing problem, in light 
of the malpractice crisis and the court's responsibility to resolve 
constitutional doubts in favor of the legislature's actions, the 
court should have attempted to construe the malpractice act with 
greater imagination and sounder reasoning. 
The procedure governing the Illinois malpractice mediation 
panel is a cross between binding compulsory arbitration and an 
arbitration agreement: 80 it forces all claims to be submitted to a 
mediation panel as in compulsory arbitration, but like contrac-
tual arbitration arrangements it enforces a judgment only when 
all the parties agree to be bound by the result. Had certain factors 
been properly analyzed, however, the court should have con-
strued the mediation panel as closer in· form to the arbitration 
agreement. 
The following chart demonstrates the possible situations that 
could arise under the medical malpractice panel statute. 
Reaction of Parties Panel's Decision 
Unanimous written 
agreement to abide 
by panel's decision 
before panel decides 
Unanimous written 
agreement to accept 
decision of panel 
already rendered 
No unanimous 
agreement 
2tol 
or 
3to0 
2tol 
or 
3to0 
3to0 
Result 
Conclusive- judgment 
will be entered thereon 
unless the parties agree 
that no judgment be 
entered. 
Conclusive - unless the 
parties unanimously 
reject the decision. 
Party must reject the 
decision within 28 days 
If rejected: matter 
proceeds to trial. 
If not rejected: 
decision is conclusive. 
78. Notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra. 
79. Notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra. 
80. Notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra. 
Comment 
Parties not rejecting 
get expert witnesses 
at trial supplied by 
panel. If rejecting 
party loses at trial, 
may have to pay 
all costs. 
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No unanimous 
agreement 
2 to 1 Case automatically 
proceeds to trial in 
usual manner. Judge 
conducts pretrial 
conference. 
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The court found that since the panel was required to make its 
determination "according to the applicable substantive law,"81 
the physician and lawyer members of the panel could prevail over 
the opinion of the judge and there by usurp an inherently judicial 
function. 82 Given the prior acceptance by Illinois courts of volun-
tary arbitration agreements, this reasoning is invalid. 83 If the par-
ties agree to be bound by the panel's finding either before or after 
its determination, the resultant procedure operates similarly to 
arbitration by voluntary agreement, which does not require the 
involvement of a judge.84 
If the parties do not agree to be bound by the panel's deci-
sion, the situation is removed from the realm of the analogous 
arbitration agreement. In this situation, however, the judicial 
function is not usurped. If the panel decision is unanimous, the 
judge member of the panel could not be in a minority position, 
and any party rejecting the decision within twenty-eight days can 
force the proceeding to trial. If the judge (or any other member 
of the panel) disagrees with the majority decision, the case auto-
matically proceeds to trial in a court of original jurisdiction unless 
the parties subsequently agree to abide by the result. In the event 
of such agreement by the parties, the situation is once again 
analogous to the voluntary arbitration agreement, a contract that 
is constitutionally permitted in virtually every jurisdiction.85 This 
analysis eliminates the court's objection that the physician and 
lawyer members of the panel could prevail over judicial author-
ity. 
The court also could have interpreted the mediation panel 
proceeding to be analogous to a mandatory pretrial conference.86 
Provisions of the Illinois Civil Practice Act establishing the mal-
81. Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.7 (1975). 
82. Notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra. 
83. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra. 
84. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra. 
85. Notes 5-9, 16-18 and accompanying text supra. 
86. This approach was suggested by a concurring justice in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 
So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976). 
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practice panel87 were added to the section governing pretrial pro-
cedure, 88 suggesting a legislative intent to classify proceedings of 
the malpractice panel as pretrial in nature. Court rules governing 
pretrial conferences permit the circuit court to hold such a confer-
ence in any civil case to consider, among other specifically men-
tioned objectives, "any ... matters which may aid in the dispo-
sition of the action."89 The circuit court is further directed to 
enter an order stipulating the agreements made by the parties 
and delineating any issues for trial not decided during the confer-
ence. 90 Striking parallels exist between pretrial conferences and 
mediation panel proceedings. 91 
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Grace v. Howlett92 rejected 
the contention that a system of compulsory arbitration under the 
state's no-fault automobile statute was analogous to a mandatory 
pretrial conference. The decision, however, was based on the fact 
that if a claim proceeded to trial, the court would be reviewing a 
final judgment on appeal in violation of the Judicial Article of 
1962 that abolished trials de novo. 93 The malpractice mediation 
panel does not make any conclusive determinations unless both 
parties agree, and any further action that is undertaken in the 
circuit court is brought not as an appeal but as a normal case filed 
in the court of original jurisdiction.94 In the instant case the court 
did not refer to its decision in Grace, likely because of the above 
distinction. 
87. Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-58.10 (1975). 
88. ld. § 58.1. 
89. ILL. PRAc. ACT & R. ch. 110A, § 218(a)(5)(Smith-Hurd 1976). 
90. ld. § 218(b). 
91. The purpose of the malpractice mediation panel, like that of a pretrial conference, 
is to encourage parties to reach agreement on all possible issues. When the parties cannot 
agree, however, the claim proceeds to trial in the normal manner. Mediation panel pro-
ceedings, like unresolved issues discussed in pretrial conference, are also not admissible 
in a subsequent trial. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4) 
(1975). 
92. 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). 
93. ld. at 489-90, 283 N.E.2d at 480-81; notes 11, 25 supra. The dissenting judge in 
Grace challenged the application of the Judicial Article of 1962 to an appeal from the 
arbitration board as being an unwarranted extension of the prohibition against an appeal 
de novo. 51 Ill. 2d at 512, 283 N.E.2d at 491-92. An adoption of the dissent's reasoning on 
this point alone might have resulted in an entirely different holding in which the arbitra-
tion board could have continued to function in certain automobile accident disputes. 
94. Even if the court determined that an action instituted in the district court after 
the parties failed to agree at the mediation panel level were, in effect, a trial de novo, the 
arguments voiced by the dissenting justice in Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d at 512, 283 
N .E.2d at 491-92 would be even more persuasive that such trials de novo were not contem-
plated in the Judicial Article of 1962 abolishing them, and therefore would be excluded 
from the prohibition. 
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One important reservation should be mentioned when at-
tempting to cast panel proceedings in the light of a pretrial con-
ference. Language in the mediation panel statute directs the 
judge to conduct a pretrial conference in the event the parties 
cannot agree and the panel's finding is not unanimous. 95 This 
indicates that the legislature did not intend the mediation panel 
procedure to be a pretrial conference as such. The close similarity 
both in purpose and procedure between the two proceedings, how-
ever, would have allowed the court to reasonably construe the 
malpractice panel act as consistent with the state constitution. 
B. Mediation Panels and the Right to Jury Trial 
Although the court found that the statute violated the right 
to jury trial, it relied heavily on its finding that the statute uncon-
stitutionally delegated judicial functions. After limited discus-
sion of the jury trial issue, the court finally concluded, rather 
weakly, that "[b]ecause we have held that these statutes provid-
ing for medical review panels are unconstitutional [due to an 
impermissible delegation of judicial functions], it follows that 
the procedure prescribed therein as the prerequisite to jury trial 
is an impermissible restriction on the right of trial by jury 
•••• "
96 The court cited precedent that the retention of the es-
sentials of the right to jury trial, even though details in procedure 
are adjusted, protects this constitutional prerogative.97 As if to 
underscore its deliberate effort to afford the legislature leeway in 
designing future malpractice litigation procedures, the court con-
cluded that "[i]n so holding, however, we do not imply that a 
valid pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised. " 98 
The court's recognition that valid mediation procedures 
could be devised is reasonable in light of recently established 
precedent from other jurisdictions. A recent unsuccessful consti-
tutional challenge to New York's mediation panel procedure was 
based not on interference with obtaining a jury trial, but on the 
fact that panel findings, admissible in court, unduly prejudice the 
jury and prevent a fair determination. 99 The Illinois statute pre-
95. Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4) (1975). 
96. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741 (emphasis added). 
97. People v. Lobb, 171ll. 2d at 299, 161 N.E.2d at 332. 
98. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741. 
99. Halpern v. Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976). In Florida, a state in which 
the right to trial by jury is also strictly construed (note 53 and accompanying text supra) 
a recent case challenging the constitutionality of a mediation panel procedure similar to 
that of Illinois did not even raise the issue of interference with this right, and the court 
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eludes such a challenge by banning the record of mediation panel 
proceedings from a subsequent trial. 100 The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, in holding that state's compulsory arbitration stat-
ute constitutional, maintained that "there is no denial of the 
right of trial by jury if the statute preserves that right to each of 
the parties by the allowance of an appeal from the decision of the 
arbitrators or other tribunal."101 The Illinois law ensures the par-
ties the right to trial by jury if no consensus is reached with the 
mediation panel; only if all parties agree to bind themselves to 
the panel's determination is the jury right forgone. 102 
Decisions in Florida and New York upholding similar legisla-
tion creating malpractice mediation panels had not been handed 
down when the Supreme Court of Illinois declared the Illinois 
statute unconstitutional. Had these decisions been available, the 
court might have held differently. Although the court did not 
specify the kind of pretrial panel that would be permissible, 103 it 
in essence volunteered that if a malpractice panel procedure 
could be created that did not contravene the constitution on any 
other ground, panel proceedings would not violate the jury clause 
of the Illinois Constitution. 
C. Implications of the Court's Decision 
The most immediate impact of the court's decision is the 
reinstitution of the traditional tort claims process for malpractice 
suits in Illinois. A return to the former means of litigation carries 
with it the significant risk that personal injury awards will con-
tinue to escalate, hiking insurance rates for malpractice coverage 
still further and giving physicians incentive to limit their prac-
tices or leave the profession altogether. 104 
A second result of the court's decision is the surrender of 
significant benefits that could be secured by use of the panel 
procedure. Admittedly, the mediation panel is no panacea for the 
variety of problems surrounding the malpractice crisis. For those 
who reject panel determinations and proceed to trial, the media-
tion procedure presents an additional hurdle in an already com-
plicated and expensive adjudication procedure. Others may even 
upheld the entire statute as constitutional. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976). 
100. Medical Malpractice Act § 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(4)(1975). 
101. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 230, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (1955) (citations omitted). 
102. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra. 
103. For an indication that some form of pretrial panel procedure for malpractice 
suits would be acceptable, see note 96 and accompanying text supra. 
104. Notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra. 
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be discouraged from proceeding further at all. But the advantages 
of the malpractice mediation panel seem to significantly out-
weigh the potential detriments. Panels are composed of experts 
who, unlike members of a jury, are accustomed to dealing with 
complex medical malpractice questions and are thus able to 
effectively screen out nonmeritorious claims. As a result of their 
expertise, the informal nature of panel proceedings, and built-in 
incentives for the parties to settle, panel members are able to 
dispose of claims with a significantly higher degree of efficiency 
than the courts. In New York, cases that had been on the court's 
docket for nearly a decade were quickly resolved and displayed a 
substantially higher settlement rate than before the mediation 
panel was introduced. 105 On the average, settlement of cases has 
resulted in a savings of five trial days per case. 106 Quicker disposi-
tion and avoidance of lengthy legal proceedings promises tremen-
dous reduction in the expense of handling malpractice claims. 
Projections of such savings has caused at least one insurance 
company to reduce its premiums for malpractice insurance in 
New York by two percent. 107 Potentially damaging publicity to 
physicians charged with malpractice is minimized by the more 
private nature of mediation panel proceedings, and the difficulty 
of securing expert witnesses to testify in behalf of meritorious 
claimants at trial is overcome. 108 
Malpractice mediation panels similar to that enacted in Illi-
nois offer an attractive alternative to litigation: by means of an 
inexpensive process, nonmeritorious claims are discouraged while 
justifiable claims are either quickly settled or propelled into trial 
with expert testimony ensured. Particularly important in the 
light of this note is the additional fact that under most mediation 
panel statutes, including that of Illinois, the courts and a jury 
trial remain available to the parties, thus guaranteeing basic con-
stitutional rights. 
105. Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial De-
partment of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HoFSTRA L. REv. 261, 275-76 (1974). 
106. !d. at 278. 
107. Comment, Medical Malpractice in New York, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 657, 795 
(1976) (citing STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 126-27 (1976)). 
108. See Medical Malpractice Act§ 1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(5) (1975), which 
provides: 
Whenever a unanimous determination of a medical review panel is rejected 
by a party, each party that has accepted the determination may request any 
medical society which has supplied names for the roster of practicing physicians 
for that panel to provide an expert witness for consultation and, if necessary, 
for testimony at trial. 
